

## Chapter– II

### **The Illusory ‘Peshawar Seven’ *Tanzimat* (Parties)**

“Some embraced martyrdom for the honor of the homeland;  
Others erected palaces on the blood of the martyrs”.

(Pashtu Tappa)<sup>1</sup>

The April 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan ousted the Musahiban, or Yahya Khel, family and the traditional elite from power, liquidated the old Pashtun monarchy, and revolutionary leaders invited the Soviets for the defense of their fatherland, their Marxist-Leninist ideology and, above all, their own regime in power. The traditional forces of power (*khans*, *maliks*, and *mullahs*) were pushed to the wall not just by virtue of being ousted from the

corridors of power; an official campaign was launched against them in the government-controlled media, and various decrees were issued which aimed at curtailing their power and prestige. Even the neutral circles among the educated elite were compelled either to join the PDPA or face persecution. Naturally all these disgruntled elements including *khans*, *maliks* and *mullahs* were in search of new positions of power. When there was no chance to absorb themselves in the ruling PDPA or to live peacefully as a neutral entities, they had no option but to flee from Afghanistan to join the religious or secular right in various countries.

The result was open defiance and rebellion by the masses; resistance and *jihad* for fourteen long years, with the sacrifice of one and a half million human souls; and the migration of one-sixth of its population from the country.

Among the two Islamic Republics neighboring of Afghanistan, Iran was itself in a post-revolutionary turmoil with tremendous problems of its own. Its anti-US stance and revolutionary dogmas also limited the scope for the Western world and the pro-US Gulf States to help the new Iranian government address even the limited number of Afghan refugees who fled to that country. While the *Mujahideen* who took refuge in Iran remained more or less neutral, this was not so for those who took the road to Pakistan, another neighbor of Afghanistan. For the latter, exile soon became the surest path to resistance. Pakistan offered them shelter and the means to continue the struggle. It soon learnt to use them for its own ends.<sup>2</sup>

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was already planning to dismantle the Moscow-Delhi-Kabul triangle of the Cold War, and the military *junta* under General Zia-ul-Haq discovered the weakness of the Kabul regime with Pakistan's strategy to hijack the entire Afghan anti-Soviet resistance movement. Just after few weeks of the Afghan Revolution, Zia reportedly suggested to the US President Jimmy Carter that he would destabilize the communist government, but Carter apparently refused.<sup>3</sup> Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, former NSA head, confessed in an interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France) confessed that it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention... The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. Indeed, for almost ten years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.<sup>4</sup>

In this new anti-Soviet and anti-Kabul alliance, the Zia regime was supported by the US and almost all-religious and almost all of the religious and secular right wing in Pakistan. Those anti-Daud Afghan elements which were working under the pay of Pakistan and had been living in Pakistan in relative obscurity since 1973<sup>5</sup> were reorganized by ISI. The local anti-Kabul resistance took the form of anti-Soviet *jehad*, with the religious elite at the forefront.

Their services were hired both by the Islamic East and the Secular / Christian West. The cry of "Islam in danger" was raised, and the movement of *ghaza* and *jehad* was carried to the extreme. Initially, about four dozen factions and groups, under various names old and new and boasting a variety of flags and programs sprang up among the refugees in Pakistan. They could be divided into the following main categories:

- 1: Twenty religious oriented groups, covering the spectrum from conservatives / traditionalists to revolutionary Islamists.
- 2: Five national-democratic groups.
- 3: Eleven non-Moscow communists of varying shades.<sup>6</sup>

The leading role among the Afghan refugees was played by the following elements:

- a) The *mullahs* and *pirs*, who preached the necessity and the holiness of *jehad*.
- b) The *maliks* and *khans*, and minor tribal chiefs who consolidated their power in the *jehad* and founded local and tribal organizations.
- c) The *Jamiat* and the *Hezb-e-Islami*, with their various respective factions.
- d) Moderate organizations.

- e) Other rightist and leftist groups and parties including the Afghan *Millat* and Maoists.
- f) Teachers and intellectuals with various organizations inside and out side the country.<sup>7</sup>

According to Olivier Roy, in the post-revolutionary scenario three different patterns emerged, which had characterized the history of the resistance parties throughout the war:

- A number of loosely structured parties, made up of local fronts, corresponding to the segmentation of Afghan society and indicative of the rivalries of potential leaders and their followers; these multiple groups joined in a loose coalition. They were the so-called moderate parties.
- A dominant party, which had renounced its quintessential character to absorb peoples who were not ideologically committed from the very beginning: this was *Jamiat*.
- A very homogeneous party, of the Leninist type in organization (though not in ideology): this was the *Hezb* of Hekmatyar.<sup>8</sup>

Almost all party leaders of the Afghans refugees in Pakistan tried to present themselves to be the only true Muslims, patriotic, as pro-Pakistani, and as the real leaders of the Afghans; and they maligned the others with all imaginable misdeeds and evils. Afghan intellectuals, poets and writers have persistently deplored this state of affairs, because these people did not find any party responsive to their advice. The majority of these people ended up being frustrated

to the extent that they had to leave Pakistan for other countries. This brain drain, unwisely encouraged by the anti-Soviet bloc, deprived the Afghans' leadership of right thinking and guidance.<sup>9</sup>

Genuine lovers of freedom and other anti-Soviet elements in Pakistan were stressing the need for unity among the refugee organizations for realization of their common cause, but did so in vain. The first attempt of an alliance was made in 1978, when the fresh wave of refugees poured into Pakistan, including some religious scholars and leaders. The religious leaders forced *Hezb-e-Islami* (HIA) and *Jamiat-e-Islami* (JIA), the only two old parties at that time, to coalesce. These parties had grown from the *Jawan-e-Musalman* (Young Muslims), backed by *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan, and were still claiming to be upholding the cause of Islamic brotherhood. The alliance of these parties was forged in August 1978, under the name of *Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan* (HIIA) and was chaired by Maulvi Sakhi Dad Faez of the JIA, which was later challenged by Eng. Gulbadin Hekmatyar who suggested a "third person" for the post. Consequently, Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, one of the promoters, was chosen to replace Faez. However, Maulvi Mohammadi and his group of religious followers failed to administer the two component parties of the alliance, and it ultimately fell apart in January 1979. And HIIA became a new party under the leadership of Maulvi Muhammad Mohammadi.

In September of 1979, the *Jamiat-e-Islami*, the HIIA and newly formed *Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Mill-Afghanistan* (JNMA) of Sibghatullah Mujaddedi agreed to form an alliance known as *Paiman-Ittehad-e-Islami* (a pledge to Islamic unity). A joint council

was elected to run the alliance, but for all practical purposes it also proved to be a paper-alliance as each component party maintained its own office and implemented its own program.<sup>10</sup>

On 27<sup>th</sup> November, 1979, *Jehad* was declared jointly by the resistance parties in Peshawar but no further details are available about who proclaimed the *jehad*. It should be noted that even from Islamic perspective it was not justified to declare *jehad* against PDPA regime, because the Soviets forces intervened later on in December. However, despite the fact that this activity took place before the Soviet intervention, already by this time the armed resistance in its own self-understanding was a *jehad*, though initially the PDPA regime was not entirely unsuccessful in labeling the rebels as *ashrar* (sinful) and *basmach* (bandit).<sup>11</sup>

An interesting account is given by S. Fida Yunis, former Charge d' Affairs, Pakistan Embassy, Kabul (1981-92), and once an officer on special duty in Afghan Refugees Commissionrate, Peshawar in one of his books *Afghanistan* volume-II:

On December 9, 1978, at the behest of Pakistan's Foreign affairs (ministry) a meeting of the following Afghan [elders/leaders] was arranged at the residence of the author (Fida Yunis), behind Jabar Flats, Tehkal Bala, and Peshawar:

- 1: S. Mujaddadi,
- 2: G. Hekmatyar,
- 3: Dr. Bashir Zakria (an Afghan holding US nationality),

- 4: B. Rabbani,
- 5: S. A E Gilani,
- 6: Maulvi Ghulam Nabi Khan Aamer,
- 7: Qazi Muhammad Amin Waqad,
- 8: Maulvi Nasrullah Ahmadzai of Paktia,
- 9: Shafiullah Muhammad of Kama,
- 10: Abdul Qader Bayan Khel Mullagori.

The participants appreciating the need for unity, and a struggle against the communist Kabul regime; however, soon the atmosphere became charged when differences developed over the leadership of a united front and in the discussion every one started to accuse the other. The meeting was called off lest the situation went out of control.

The second meeting was scheduled for December 11, 1978 but cancelled by the Foreign Ministry.<sup>12</sup>

S. Fida Yunis further commented that it was perhaps under pressure from *Jama'at-e-Islami* Pakistan and the ISI that the Foreign Ministry changed the decision, due to fear of losing its favorite, Hekmatyar, in the future overall leadership of a united front. Even on 5<sup>th</sup> December, 1978, the young members of the Hekmatyar group attacked the office of Rabbani and proclaimed Hekmatyar as the sole leader of the Afghan refugees.<sup>13</sup>

When the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan on 27<sup>th</sup> December 1979 with a serious challenge to refugees, the *Paiman-Ittehad-e-Islami* just faded in the face of the rising threat, and fresh efforts toward unity in the ranks and files of refugee's parties. In January 1980, all the major six parties started negotiations on unification. Hekmatyar backed out after 18-day round of players due to a dispute over the number of representatives in the proposed council. Other parties which signed the document of the alliance were: JIA, HIA of Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, HIIA of Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, JNMA of Mujaddedi and *Mahaz- e-Milli-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan* (MMIA) of Pir Syed Ahmad Effendi Gilani. The alliance was called *Ittehad-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan* (IIA). Abdul Rasul Sayaf was elected its leader. However, Sayaf later changed his name to Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf due to his adherence to the doctrine of Wahabis of *Akhwan al-Muslimeen*. Because of this doctrinal difference, other leaders denounced the alliance. On paper, however, it remained, with a few offices and a number of office holders from each party.<sup>14</sup>

It was believed that these parties had been forced by the 'donor agencies' for unification against the atheist force of Communism. To properly expedite the resistance movement inside Afghanistan properly in an organized manner, Islamabad used the Afghan political structures already existing on their territory since the mid-1970s. Saudi Arabia, the leading donor, had established direct contact with the refugee parties and even they openly distributed money among the refugee's camps in Peshawar.<sup>15</sup>

In February 1981, the HIIA, the JNMA and the MMIA formally denounced the IIA, and declared that they were considering another alliance. The IIA was, thus, reduced from an alliance to a party led by Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf. Commenting on the making and breaking of alliances, a contemporary Afghan writer Azizur Rahman Ulfat tried to expose the tactics of selfish elements “who are out to sell their country and the nation for a mess of pottage” by publishing in 1981 a Pashtu document along with English translation signed by S. Ahmad Gillani, Maulvi Y. Khalis, S. Mujaddadi and Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi in a booklet. Following is the English translation of the document:

“For the reasons that *Ittehad-e-Islami Burai-Azadi Afghanistan* under the Presidentship of honorable Sayaf within a period of one year, and in accordance with the manifesto which we agreed upon, this union did not only benefit each constituent member on the basis of its share from foreign aid, but also as Sayaf himself admitted has violated the manifesto of the union, and now the time has come for a new party to be brought into existence under his guidance. Such happening would bring shame and disgrace from the outside world to us. For these reasons we announce the dissolution of previous union or *Ittehad* and make an effort to bring a real new unity which would have a united leadership for the member’s parties. Also we expect that Mr. Sayaf would refrain from dishonesty

and stay with us as a brother and clean himself by his accountability that he owes”.<sup>16</sup>

Commenting on misappropriation in the foreign fund for refugee and the lust of the party leaders for money and power, Azizur Rahman stated:

“Unfortunately, the aid and assistance given to this leadership by Islamic and western institutions and governments, especially the Arabs, has not been spent properly, not even upto 20 percent of the total, for the holy war and for the benefit of refugees...50 percent is swallowed for the cause of Islamization, 30 percent goes to the bank account of so-called leaders. Those who had no donkeys in Afghanistan are now seen driving big cars in Pakistan. The dinning tables that belong to these leaders are full of luxury food and gains at the cost of blood of martyrs and leaving the majority of Afghan refugees in the lurch who are dying of hunger... The country is ours, the Afghans are making sacrifices for it but the decisions are taken by foreigners”.<sup>17</sup>

In those days, about 200 religious leaders from Afghanistan formed a *jirga* to put pressure on the parties to take a united course of action. Their 4-month struggles culminated into a declaration on September 16, 1981, by the following parties, on formation of an alliance in the name of *Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan* (Islamic Unity of *Mujahideen* of Afghanistan- IIMA): the JIA, the

HIA (H), the HIA (K), the HIIA (Mohammadi), the JNMA, and the MMIA. However, the MMIA, one of the initiators, stepped out. But the names of HIIA (Mansoor) and IIA of Sayaf were also not included.

The Main differences among these parties were over the leadership, representation, weapons and funds. It was finally resolved to form a High Council with 10 members from each component party, and to give every party the chance of leadership in rotation. The order of priority was, however, not defined. The parties changed position and eventually there came into existence two alliances:

- (a) a 7-party alliance or IIMA comprising the HIA (H), the HIA (K), the JIA, and the IIA (these four parties were officially recognized); as well as the HIIA (Mansoor), the HIIA (Moezin), and JNMA (Mohammad Mir) (which were not officially recognized as parties);
- (b) a 3-party alliance or IIMA, comprising HIIA (Mohammadi), the JNMA (Mujaddidi), and the MMIA (all officially recognized)

The Afghan resistance movement can broadly be classified into three categories.

- (1) The Peshawar-Based Seven.
- (2) The Tehran Based Eight, and<sup>18</sup>
- (3) Those without a base outside Afghanistan.

## The Peshawar-Based Seven:

Of these parties, the most influential and organized groups of the refugees were based in Pakistan, particularly in Peshawar. They were made up of almost all sections of the Afghan society, and included religious leaders, feudal landlords, members of several nationalist groups and former bureaucrats, disenchanted members of the PDPA, and deserters of the Afghan army; members of all these demographics were either in one group or another or were serving in NGOs.

To restrict the growing number of the resistance groups, the Government of Pakistan imposed restrictions on them in early 1981, and officially allowed only six parties to function. The *Ittehad -e- Islami* was later included, which brought the number of recognized parties to seven. Most of their offices were located in Peshawar, and were often referred to as the Peshawar “Seven” or *Haftganah*. or ‘Peshawar Seven’ were:

1. *Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Gul Baddin Hekmatyar
2. *Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Maulvi Younas Khalis
3. *Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Prof. Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani
4. *Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf
5. *Mahaz-e-Millie-e-Islami Afghanistan* of Syed Ahmad Gillani
6. *Jabha-de-Nijat-e-Milli-e-Afghanistan* of Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi

7. *Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Afghanistan* of Maulvi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi

These Seven parties were chosen by Islamabad to form the political nucleus of the resistance. Of these the first four were fundamentalists while the remaining three were Islamic nationalists.

**The Origin of Fundamentalist Parties:**

As the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan grew in strength, the rival Islamic movement, which was set up at Kabul University and in other educational institutions in the capital during the sixties, started preparing itself for armed struggle. In 1972, what had been an informal grouping of like minded intellectuals with a radical student wing adopted a formal structure, a secret constitution, and the name *Jamiat-e-Islami*, the society of Islam. After Daud's coup in 1973, the movement's president, Burhan-ud Din Rabbani, offered Daud the support of the Islamic movement provided he would break away from his Communist comrades. Daud refused and arrested many Islamists. Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud, and about a dozen other leading Islamic radicals fled to Pakistan. In Peshawar they were trained by Frontier Corps Commander Nasirullah Babur with the consent of the Federal government.<sup>19</sup> In the summer of 1975, the armed insurrections took place in several Afghan provinces but fizzled out for lack of mass support.<sup>20</sup>

The failure of the Islamic uprisings provoked an open rift in the existing Islamic movement. Though *Hezb-e-Islami* was founded by

Rabbani, Hekmatyar and Maulvi Younas Khalis in 1978, later on differences cropped up among them and Hekmatyar organized a separate party under the same name *Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan*. Three of the main Peshawar leaders (Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khalis) came to head their own parties in this way. In spite of these splits, the original members of the Islamic movement were well-placed to win themselves a mass following after the civil war began in earnest. By the end of 1980, through in an attempt to simplify and control the situation, Pakistan quietly delivered an ultimatum to the independent chieftains either to merge with the main Peshawar based parties, or lose Pakistan's military and financial support.<sup>21</sup>

Of all the Afghan resistance groups, the most important, and organized, fundamentalist party was the *Hezb-e-Islami* led by Hekmatyar.<sup>22</sup> The *Hezb* had a highly organized network with separate offices for defence, cultural, political, financial and judicial affairs as well as a potent propaganda department. It had borrowed western scientific rationalism while utterly rejecting the western values. As a result, the *Hezb*, in some ways the most active of the seven resistance organizations in Peshawar had set up the best medical hospitals and schools.<sup>23</sup> It also established schools for girls in Peshawar and Karachi and it was trying to destroy the traditional structure of Afghan society in order to replace it with an entirely new Islamic order. The secret system of the *Hezb* was very strong and it had extensive intelligence networks and used terror tactics to silence and intimidate their opponents.<sup>24</sup> The *Hezb* also had close links with the *Jammat-e-Islami* in Pakistan and was the

most favored group of Pakistan's officials and the government, though it displayed virulent public anti-American stance.<sup>25</sup> The manifesto of the party mentioned *Quran* and *Sunnah* as the supreme source of Law, and also opposed co-education in educational institutions; and stressing on compulsory military training in all educational institutions. Hekmatyar had close associations with the *Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen* (Muslim Brotherhood) and he utilized its international repute, financial assistance, and organizational know-how. The Egypt-based leader of Muslim Brotherhood, Umar Salasani, who visited Peshawar during the month of October 1982, remained in close contact with Hekmatyar and held several discussions with him. They visited several refugee camps at Warsak and other places. Other rival groups accuse *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan of interference in refugee affairs and of financial assistance of Hekmatyar group.<sup>26</sup> Hekmatyar was reportedly inspired by Imam Khomeini and desired a Khomeini-style Islamic revolution in Afghanistan. He had developed biases towards the Islamic nationalist groups and Pashtun nationalist groups. Most of his party members were students of theology, Afghan army personnel, tribal chiefs and ex-Afghan Generals.

The organization operates on many fronts throughout Afghanistan and more effectively in Kunar, Laghman, Ningrahar, Qanduz, Kabul, Paghman, Parwan and Kapisa. The Khroti, Safi, Shinwari, Khogiani and other tribes have links with Hekmatyar. About twenty thousand armed *Mujahideen* of *Hezb-e-Islami* were reportedly engaged in fighting the Russians inside Afghanistan.

The party claims to have thirty thousand men readily available for action anywhere in the field.<sup>27</sup>

The second most important resistance party was *Jamiat-e-Islami*, headed by Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, a Tajik and the only non-Pashtun among the resistance leaders. The *Jamiat* was committed to a radical restructuring of all aspects of life in Afghanistan i.e. political, judicial, social, economic and educational in accordance with the Islamic laws and principles. It was generally referred to in the west as fundamentalist. Though, fundamentalist in nature, but its leadership is more liberal as compared to Hekmatyar for the implementation of Islamic laws. Rabbani is an appropriate symbol of his party's more moderate style. The supporters of the *Jamiat* are mostly Dari speaking Tajiks and to a lesser extent the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup> Rabbani came to Pakistan in 1978 and formed a party along with Khalis and Hekmatyar but later on he left them and organized his own party, the *Jamiat-e-Islami*. Some of the reputed commanders in its ranks were Ismail Khan, Zabih Ullah and Ahmad Shah Masud. Rabbani enjoyed support in Panjsher Valley (Kapisa Province), in Badakhshan, Takhar, and Parwan Provinces; and he also had some influence in Kunar, Paktia and few other Pashto speaking provinces of Afghanistan. The party's fighting strength was about twelve to thirteen thousands.<sup>29</sup>

The *Hezb-e-Islami* Afghanistan (Khalis Group) was another fundamentalist party of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Younis Khalis got his preliminary education at various religious institutions in Afghanistan. Later he moved to NWFP for further

education in religious institutions at Ghurghushti and at *Darul Ulum* Akora Khattak, Nowshera District. During the premiership of Sardar Daud he formed an organization called *Hezb Tawabin* against obscenity in Ningrahar and Kabul. This organization later started a weekly called *Gaheez* in 1968. The weekly published material to popularize Islamic values, and received help from Abul Aala-al Maudoodi, the chief of *Jama'at-e-Islami*, Pakistan. Following his differences with Hekmatyar, Y. Khalis set up his own organization in 1979 with the name of *Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan* (Khalis Group). Despite the fact that the party's ideology was not that different from that of others, Khalis was the most charismatic resistance leader, who holding court in the party offices, seated in a broken armchair surrounded by his lieutenants.<sup>30</sup> The party manifesto opposed exploitation on regional and linguistic grounds and favored Islamic laws and an elected representative government through general elections. It also advocated segregation of male and female workers and professed the idea that the only solution to the Afghan crisis was military and not political. The Khalis group was based mainly in the south-eastern provinces of Ningrahar and Paktia.

The *Ittehad-e-Islami* led by Professor Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf, who came to Pakistan in January 1980, was also a fundamentalist party. When he came to Pakistan, he stressed forging unity among the resistance leaders, succeeded in forming an alliance named *Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan*, and he was elected its president. The alliance, however, fell apart after a year and its component parties got separated, though Sayyaf continued

to lead a group under the name of *Ittehad-e-Islami*.<sup>31</sup> At the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference held in May, 1980 in Islamabad, Sayyaf represented the five party alliances. The majority of members of his party were Pashtun from Paghman, Ningrahar and Paktia province of Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> The party published its daily called *Ittehad-e-Islami*.<sup>33</sup> He had some influence in Kabul, Ningrahar and Paktya provinces of Afghanistan.

### **The Origin of Islamic Nationalist Parties:**

Among the Islamic nationalist parties *Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami* Afghanistan led by Sayed Ahmad Gailani (Effandi Agha) accommodated comparatively liberal, Islamic, and nationalist elements in Peshawar. S.A Gailani is the son of late Sayed Hasan Gailani (aka Naqib Sahib), a well-known spiritual leader of Surkh Rud, Ningrahar province. The family later on permanently settled in Kabul. Sayed Ahmad Gailani migrated to Pakistan in 1978, and formed *Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami* Afghanistan ((National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) with a black flag as his party emblem. This party possessed Islamic as well as nationalist characteristics and had close association with Zahir Shah (ex-Afghan Monarch) and was considered as pro-western in outlook. Pir Gailani was known as a liberal and perhaps the most secular of the Peshawar based resistance leaders. The party had a sizeable following in Paktya, Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces and also had some following in Ghazni and Wardak provinces. Zadrans, Mangal, Jaji, Ahmadzai, Tareen and Kochis (Powindahs) and other Pashtun tribes were affiliated with this group. The party chief had reportedly more than 80 thousand followers in Afghanistan but due

to lack of arms and ammunition they had only about twenty thousand fighters in Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup>

The second important part *Jubah-e-Nijat-e-Milli Afghanistan* (Afghanistan National Liberation Front) led by Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, a Syed of *Naqshbandi* order After his early education at Kabul he got his Master's Degrees in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University, Egypt, in 1953. He worked as lecturer at Higher Institute for teachers training and the Institute of Higher Islamic learning, Kabul but was arrested in 1955 on the charges of abetting a coup against the regime. He organised a movement of 'ulama under the name of *Ulama-e-Muhammad* in 1970. He was reportedly the one who mobilised public opinion in Kabul in favour of Pakistan during 1971 Indo-Pak war. He came to Pakistan in 1978, and established *Jubah-e-Nijat-e-Milli* at Peshawar. He is a spiritual leader and a descendant of Mullah Shore Bazaar. Most of his party members were his spiritual disciples and intellectual personalities and some tribal chiefs. Like the NIFA, the *Jabhah* succeeded in attracting farmers, officers, doctors and other educated Afghans. It was the smallest of the Peshawar seven parties, but Mujaddedi was effective in dealing with both western and Islamic audiences and leaders.<sup>35</sup> The party believed that sincere and true application of Islamic principles was the only way for the salvation of the Afghan nation. Its aim was to establish a peaceful society based on Islamic brotherhood, social justice and democracy. The party manifesto mentioned that political power belongs to people; therefore the party stated that it would not tolerate any person or any party which would falsely

claim to be the sole custodians of national will, and that it emphatically opposed the re-establishment of any dictatorship. Mujaddedi was deadly opposed to Hekmatyar. The party had reportedly about 14 to 18 thousand fighters in the field.<sup>36</sup>

The third important Peshawar based party of the refugees was the *Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami* led Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Muhammadi was a religious scholar and a teacher in *Madarassa-e-Qila-e-Abbas*, a religious seminary in Logar, Afghanistan. In 1969, he was elected a member of the *Ulsi Jirga* (lower house of Parliament) from Logar Province. He reportedly started a campaign against the *Khalq*, a mouthpiece of *Khalq* faction of PDPA Party, and also organised a procession of *Ulama* in 1972 at *Masjid-e-Pull-Khasti* in Kabul to register protest against the activities of Communist groups and the Russian influence. He migrated to Pakistan after the April 1978 upheaval. He invited the *Ulama*, students, ex-Afghan army officers and intellectuals to organise a party under the name of *Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan* at Quetta (Pakistan). Later on Hekmatyar and Khalis invited him to Peshawar and got him elected as the President of their alliance, but the alliance could not work for more than six months and its constituent parties got separated. The *Harkat* represented much of the spirit of traditional Afghans. It was a moderate party, religious and nationalistic in character. Most of its members were *ulama* or *taliban* (students of seminaries), tribal *maliks* (Chiefs) and ex-army personnel. The *Harkat's* leaders were often local *mullahs*. It lacked the *Sufi* background of other traditionalist parties but its authority also remains religious rather

than territorial or political. This party had a strong support among the Pashtuns.<sup>37</sup>

The party program was to liberate their homeland from Soviet occupation, after which Martial Law would be imposed for six months to normalize the situation in the country such that parliamentary elections could be held in order to hand over power to the elected members of the people. Their party manifesto contemplated formation of a broad-based Islamic alliance, friendly relations with the Islamic World, introduction of an interest free banking system, agricultural reforms and the establishment of a true Islamic society. The party was deadly opposed to *Hezb-e-Islami* (Hekmatyar Group) but extended cooperation to the Rabbani Group at various fronts across the border. The party had sufficient following in Logar, Ghazni, Kabul and Heart Provinces and also had some following in Paktia, Kandahar and Hilmand Provinces. This party had also said to have close links with Maulana Fazalur Rehman's *Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI) of Pakistan.<sup>38</sup>

The Islamic Nationalist groups including the Mujaddidi Group, the Effandi Group and the Muhammad Nabi Group, formed an alliance under the name of *Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan* (Islamic Unity of Afghan *Mujahideen*) towards the end of 1981. The alliance office was situated in Peshawar city where the representatives of the component parties worked as a single unit. The alliance also prepared a flag as the symbol of their unity and co-ordinated their activities inside Pakistan as well as across the border. The alliance was composed of the following

committees: (1) Supreme Advisory Council (*Majlis-e-Shura*), (2) Board of Directors (composed of party leaders), (3) Executive Council, (4) Secretariat of the Supreme Council and the Executive Council, (5) Political Bureau, (6) Military Bureau, (7) Cultural and Press Bureau, (8) Finance Committee, (9) Refugee Bureau, (10) Invitation and Management Bureau, (11) Judicial Bureau, (12) Security and Intelligence Supervisory Bureau, (13) Education Training and Propagation Bureau, (14) Health Bureau, (15) Administrative Bureau, (16) Legislative Bureau. The alliance publishes a weekly, called *Afghan Jihad* and some other leaflets to project their activities across the border. The alliance was also engaged in publishing literature in Russian language emanating from various pro-Afghan and Islamic Organisations in the Western countries.<sup>39</sup>

### **The Strength of the Peshawar Based Parties:**

One point was projected and debated both within and outside Pakistan about the disunity among the resistance parties. But to the close observer, first, this was all well planned, with a high degree of sophistication, by the secret agencies for more and more control over the resistance; and secondly, this diversity in the rank and file of the parties broadened the scope for all segments of the Afghan society to join the party of one's own choice.

Roughly, the total organized strength of the major fighting parties as reportedly claimed was about 73,000 organized cadre and 151,000 total following:

- o *Hezb-e-Islami*: 30000 Fighters & 67,500 Followers.

- o *Harkat*: 10,000 Fighters & 25,000 Followers.
- o *Jamiat -e-Islami*: 11,000 Fighters & 21,000 Followers.
- o *Jabaha-e-Nijat-e-Milli*: 9,000 Fighters & 15,000 Followers.
- o *Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami*: 8,000 Fighters & 15,000 Followers.
- o *Hezb* (Khalis group): 5,000 Fighters & 7,500 Followers.<sup>40</sup>

### **The Role of “Peshawar Seven” in Pakistan’s Strategic Scheme:**

Zia forced refugee leaders to join the alliance of Seven Parties, and the Director General of the ISI, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, made it a fundamental part of his strategy for the prosecution of the war. “He attached top priority to working with, and through, the Alliance.”<sup>41</sup> It was through the alliance of political parties that ISI controlled the campaign effort.

Under Akhtar’s leadership, support for the *Jehad* was gradually stepped up so that by the mid-1980s tens of thousand of tens of arms and ammunition were moved by the ISI to the *Mujahideen* via their party warehouses. Similarly, it is no longer any secret that tens of thousands of guerrillas, with their commanders, came to Pakistan for training. From 1980 until 1987, Pakistani Army teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan to advise and assist the *Mujahideen* in their operations. All resistance commanders in the field inside Afghanistan

were required to join one of the Peshawar-based ‘Seven *Tanzimat*’ of the Afghans as it was only through the Afghan *Tanzimat* (Parties) that arms were distributed. Failure to join meant no weapons, which in turn led to loss of power and prestige in the field. Even among the ‘Peshawar Seven’ some were closer to the Pakistan’s establishment. Some 70 percent of the logistic support was given to the fundamentalist parties in total, but no single *Tanzim* got more than 20 percent.<sup>42</sup> In 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the Parties were:

Hekmatyar 18-20 per cent,

Rabbani 18-19 per cent,

Sayaf 17-18 per cent,

Khalis 13-15 per cent,

Nabi 13-15 per cent,

Gailani 10-11 per cent, and

Mujaddadi trailing with 3-5 per cent.

Certainly the ‘fundamentalists’ came out on top with 67-73 per cent, much to the CIA's chagrin, but using strictly military criteria it could never have been otherwise. In the words of Brigadier (retired) Yousaf, “My critics were taking into account political considerations and biases which, as a soldier, I was fortunately able to ignore.”<sup>43</sup>

Most Afghan experts, refugee leaders, and even the US believed that this was done for political reasons and by design; Yousaf, however, confessed with following arguments that:

“We allocated arms to the parties on a basis of operational effectiveness, but as our critics claimed (including the US and CIA) on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism... A party got weapons allocated not on the basis of size or religious fervor but purely on operational efficiency. Did the party have an efficient internal distribution system? Did its commanders cooperate with others? In the field, or were there too many instances of feuding? Did their commander operate against critical strategic targets, or were they confined to areas of little importance or activity? And, above all, were their operations successful; did they kill the enemy or destroy his vehicles, aircraft or infrastructure? These were the sort of questions Akhtar and his ISI staff asked.”<sup>44</sup>

For the first six months in the Afghan proxy war, Pakistan was alone in tackling the issue. The US, China, Saudi Arabia and others came later on with cash or weapons. The ISI created special cell, the Afghan Bureau, for handling the supply, training, and operations of tens of thousands of *Mujahideen* who were at that stage completely disorganized, ill-equipped, ill-trained, and lacking in any form of coordinated strategic direction. In plain words the fate of the entire Afghan nation and three million

refugees was decided by the Afghan Bureau of ISI, whose director was a Brigadier in Pakistan army? The ISI took following initiative to coordinate one of the largest guerrilla campaigns in modern times, with a staff of sixty officers and 300 senior NCOs and men from the Pakistan Army:

- 1: Training and arming the *Mujahideen*,
- 2: Planning their operations inside Afghanistan, and
- 3: Formulating and implementing a military strategy to defeat the communist Afghan Army and the Soviets.
- 4: ISI duties were military but it was directly involved in political decision-making.<sup>45</sup>

For the achievements of predetermined goals, the ISI took the following steps:

- 1: At the start emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen the *Mujahideen* along with Durand Line (the Pak-Afghan border).
- 2: This was partly a necessity for the *Mujahideen* for the easy distribution of supplies, and partly for the security of the Pakistan frontier region, which was slowly built up into the guerrilla's main base of supply area.
- 3: As the war progressed, and the logistic flow increased, so activities deeper inside Afghanistan were stepped up into active operations were being conducted in all 29 provinces.

- 4: *Mujahideen* commanders who were operating around Kabul got priority with regard to both training and heavy weapons.
- 5: In practice this latter meant 107mm rocket launchers- at first, the Chinese multi barrel variety, and later, the single barrel type which was (a Pakistani) improvisation, manufactured by the Chinese, to reduce weight.
- 6: ISI tactics were to train as many commanders as possible in stand-off rocket attacks, brief them as to the targets in the city, supply the weapons, and give them their missions.
- 7: The aim was to keep up the pressure on Kabul throughout the year. The airfield, roads leading into the city, particularly the Salang highway which was the Soviets lifeline to the Amu Darya, was subjected to frequent ambushing.
- 8: Inside the city military and communist government targets were selected for rocket attacks, while acts of sabotage or assassination were undertaken against installations and individuals. Kabul was at the centre of Akhtar's strategy, but he also kept a close eye on the tactics we used to implement it.<sup>46</sup>

### **Logistic Support to ‘Peshawar Seven’:**

- 1: The ISI from its own ordnance depots (of army) provided to the Afghan resistance some discarded. 303 rifles,

ammunition, old British anti-tank mines, and some Chinese manufactured shoulder-fired rocket launchers.

- 2: It established lines of communication, a 'pipeline' to get the supplies to those who needed to use the items in Afghanistan.
- 3: The Afghan Bureau within ISI at first used to transport the arms forward by night, even closing down completely during daytime in the early days.
- 4: Gradually more and more individual *Mujahideen* commanders and parties found their way onto the supply list, and the system got off the ground in a makeshift fashion. Such was the start of a 'pipeline' that was eventually to expand to a capacity of 1000 tons per week by 1986.
- 5: Above all, control over the supply of arms gave Pakistan its most direct opportunity to mastermind the course of the entire war.<sup>47</sup>

Although Islamabad permitted weapons to flow through Pakistan, it placed a quantitative and qualitative limit on the consignments. For example that it must not exceed a certain caliber (14.5 mm for machine-guns and 82 mm for mortars) and a ceiling was even imposed on the degree of technological sophistication, which barred missiles, and other forms of the most up-to-date weapons. On the political level, Islamabad was obsessed with the fear that the resistance might develop in the same way as the

Palestinian groups had done, enjoying the support of millions of refugees. It seemed to them that the best protection against this risk was a divided resistance. The Pakistanis granted the same facilities to each of the six/seven groups, and closed their eyes to the activities of the minor groups, which they did not recognize. It was thus the Pakistanis who ensured the continuance of the major split in the movement, at least until 1984.<sup>48</sup>

Islamabad's action was not, however, restricted to controlling the refugees or their parties alone; they also tried to monitor the resistance inside Afghanistan. The best instrument for a systematic, orderly, and proper coordination between the Peshawar Seven, refugees and the armed commanders in the fields, was weapon and money. The ISI's first step was to bring unity to all refugees parties in the form of the 'Peshawar Seven', and to coordinating their actions through arms and ammunitions and, to a lesser extent, information via satellite, which the Americans communicated to them.<sup>49</sup>

It is very interesting that the cold attitude of the Western countries towards the refugee parties in Pakistan changed only in 1979 with the direct intervention of the Red forces in Afghanistan. Instead of being ignored, they became necessary links between the resistance inside Afghanistan and the outside world and were adjudged to be an important trump card to be played against Moscow on the international stage. Only two things counted: the war on the ground and diplomacy on the table. The West, which had a purely pragmatic attitude towards the parties, was not interested in their structure, their social bases or their ideology, and

because of this their hopes failed to be realized on numerous occasions. It was not long before the decision to provide practical help for the resistance movement was taken in Washington, Cairo, and at Riyadh. Such outside assistance was cautious, and was provided through the intermediary of the Pakistan government, which was careful not to pour too many weapons into the country. On the diplomatic level, an Arafat was needed, or at least a PLO. The Western powers, therefore, sought to impose an alliance, even though an artificial one, using a recurring blackmail: if you want to receive aid, you must unite first.<sup>50</sup>

In the beginning Pakistan placed much less emphasis than did the West on the issues of weapons and union. Pakistan, whose new military government was not fully in control, could not afford to open an anti- Soviet front.<sup>51</sup>

The ISI's covert operations included intelligence gathering and training camps for *Mujahideen*. More secret still was the dispatch by the ISI's Afghan Bureau of Pakistani military personnel to accompany resistance fighters as advisors, even as combatants, on special missions.<sup>52</sup>

Throughout the Afghan conflict, Islamabad refused to admit to providing arms or military training to the resistance, and denied that it was allowing other countries or organizations to do so either. Even President Ziaul-Haq denied in publicly in press conferences saying that only Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan while *Mujahideen* are in the tribal areas. It was perhaps the biggest lie of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The author's (Dr. Marwat's) personal

observations of the Afghan war and, later on, Brigadier Yousaf confessions in his books unveiled the facts denied by Pakistani government. Yousaf stated that:

This need for absolute anonymity stemmed from the official denial of the government that Pakistan was aiding the *Mujahideen*. No one in authority would admit that weapons, ammunition and equipment were being channeled through Pakistan, by Pakistanis, to the guerrillas. Even more taboo was the fact that the ISI was training the *Mujahideen*, planning their combat operations, and often accompanying them inside Afghanistan as advisers. Of course the arms supply was an open secret; everybody knew it was happening, but although the involvement of Pakistan in the field was guessed at, it was never, ever, publicly admitted.<sup>53</sup>

Yousaf further stated that “during my four years some 80,000 *Mujahideen* were trained; hundreds of thousands of arms and ammunition were distributed, several billion dollars were spent on this immense logistic exercise and ISI teams regularly entered Afghanistan alongside the *Mujahideen*.”<sup>54</sup>

All refugees in the camps were required to have the membership of the ‘Peshawar Seven’ Parties for getting an identity card and ration card from the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate. Naturally the refugees were compelled to join the parties willingly or unwillingly or not. These parties even came to known as ‘ration

card parties' political circles.<sup>55</sup> In this entire process *maliks* and *mullahs* played a central role as middle man between the "Peshawar Seven Parties" and the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate. Corruption, favoritism, nepotism and bribes were some of the norms common in the registration process.

The first Commissioner of the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate was retired Brigadier while second was Mr. Abdullah, a seasoned bureaucrat who reportedly had close links with the *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan. He was openly sympathetic to Islamist movements and *Hezb* of Hekmatyar in particular.<sup>56</sup> Here it will be more relevant to mention that the author (Dr. Marwat), being Information and Research Officer in the Afghan Refugee Commissinarate at Peshawar in 1981-82, was an eyewitness to all these developments. On the very second day of my positing, Mr. Abdullah (Afghan Commissioner) told me that being an expert of Central Asian & Afghan affairs, I would not permitted to perform the official routine work of the office, but rather would translate into English from Pashto the maps and other related material of Hekmatyar's *Hezb*. Representative of the *Hezb* used to come to my office for translation of various *Hezb* documents, in a private capacity upon the recommendation of Mr. Abdullah. Another important point which I noted was that most of the employs in the Refugees Commissinarate or other related NGOs were either the members or sympathizers of the *Jama'at-e-Islami*.<sup>57</sup>

Under a carefully-planned mechanism, Pakistani authorities discriminated in dealing with the refugees parties. Radical Islamic

resistance factions were favored to the extreme by granting military and other forms of assistance, and gained open cooperation in curtailing the activities of their more traditionalists, moderate competitors. The Shi'ite factions, and the more secular/liberal and nationalist parties were, in effect, excluded from the Peshawar alliance. Similarly, in an attempt to maintain fuller control, the ISI saw to it that the Peshawar parties, rather than the commanders in the field distributed weapons. The *Hezb*, headed by Hekmatyar was clearly the most favored of the religious parties based in Peshawar. As a man of more than superficial Islamic piety, Zia saw in the *Hezb* a group which, in its authoritarian, internationalist brand of Islam, shared with him an anti-communist zeal. Perhaps the preference was on the pragmatic grounds as well because *Hezb* was viewed as the best organized and most disciplined of the several Peshawar based resistance parties. The party quickly developed what one observer referred to as "relations of trust and confidence with the military".<sup>58</sup> US representative Wilson stated that Pakistanis were "totally committed to Hekmatyar because Zia saw the world as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus, and he thought he could count on Hekmatyar to work for a Pan-Islamic entity that could stand up to India". Wilson recalled a map that Zia had also shown to him, "in which overlays indicated the goal of a confederation embracing first Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia and Kashmir".<sup>59</sup> Close ties with the conservative *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan, effectively a domestic ally of General Zia, smoothed the way for assistance to the Hekmatyar group. From the outset of the conflict, the *Jama'at-e-Islami* figured strongly in the government's efforts to mobilize

public opinion, and had been made privy to the military's Afghan policy.<sup>60</sup>

### **Pakistani Political Parties and Refugees Parties:**

The religio-political parties and groups of Pakistan openly supported the refugee's parties and the Afghan *Jehad*. Among religious parties the *Jamiat-e-Ulama* Islam of Maulana Fazal Rehman and Samiul Haq had close and cordial relations with Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Younis Khalis. But for all practical purposes they failed to extend substantial material assistance to the refugees or their favorite groups because they did not fit as well into the agenda of Zia ul-Haq regime as comparison with the *Jama'at-e-Islami*. Naturally *Jama'at-e-Islami* emerged as the only religio-political party in Pakistan which actively supported the Afghan resistance movement, and started a campaign to turn it into a *Jehad*. It was their leaders who had developed close and intimate relations with the fundamentalist's parties in the alliance of 'Peshawar Seven'. And among all the fundamentalists, *Hezb* of Hekmatyar was their favorite. They regularly held public meetings in various parts of the country in order to muster public opinion in Pakistan in favor of the *Jehad*. The former Director of ISI appreciated its role in the Afghan war.<sup>61</sup>

Almost all Pakistani regional-nationalist parties, particularly Khan Abdul Wali Khan's *Awami National Party* (ANP) and Mahmud Khan Achakzai's *Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party* (PMAP), and all the leftist and communist parties, were pro-PDPA and supported April Revolution in Afghanistan. Most of them were

against the fundamentalist parties of the Afghan refugees particularly Hekmatar's *Hezb*, for one reason or the other.

If the April Revolution supported the leftist elements in NWFP, the influx of Afghan refugees gave an opportunity to the Islamic forces to exploit them for their own political interest. Allama Arif Hussain of Parachinar rose to prominence and became the leader of the *Shia* community of Pakistan with the support of Iran. According to Nasirullah Babur, he was involved with some Pakistani generals in secretly transferring American missiles to Iran. Actually all these missiles and other ammunition were granted to the Afghan *Mujahideen* for anti-Soviet resistance.<sup>62</sup> It was because of the Afghan war that leadership of *Jamaat* transferred from Karachi brand traditional leaders to Qazi Hussain Ahmad of NWFP. Qazi became the Amir of the *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan and even he relaxed the complicated procedures of the membership of the *Jamaat*. The *Jamaat* is predominantly an urban based party, though under government patronage it has strong pockets in Dir, Malakand and Chitral districts of the NWFP. Some of the leaders of the *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan in the tribal areas were:

- 1: Abdur Rauf Shinwari and Haji Abdul Wadud in Khyber Agency.
- 2: Munsif Khan in Mohmand Agency.
- 3: Maulana Muhammad Sharif in Bajawar Agency.
- 4: Maulana Subhan in North Waziristan.<sup>63</sup>

The Afghan crisis posed a direct threat to the traditional Pashtun nationalism, and its leadership in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan, because the Kabul regime presented a new concept of Afghan nationalism with a veneer of Afghan socialism. The counter-revolutionaries and the 'Peshawar Seven' interpreted their resistance in terms of Islamic nationalism and *Jihad* against Soviet occupation. Being a champion of Pashtun nationalism and anti-colonialism, the dilemma facing Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his party was whether to support the Kabul regime or the refugee's leaders based in Peshawar. The leftists, the radicals, and the students within a party supportive of Afghan Revolution of 1978 consequently pressurized their leaders to support the Afghan Revolution openly and publicly, for the reason that the refugees parties were reactionaries, conservative, pro-American and linked with their arch rival- the *Jama'at-e-Islami*. As a result the ideological rift within the party came to the surface and some top leaders left the party and formed their own parties.

The late Noor Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin even tried to form the *Khalq* party in the tribal areas and in the NWFP, and in this connection they made contacts with some leftist and nationalist leaders. But due to their short reign and national and international pressure the idea did not materialize.<sup>64</sup>

The grand plan of ISI and CIA worked well by transforming a national liberation struggle of the Afghans into an Islamic struggle. Since a believer should know no other fatherland than that where *Sharia* reigns, the Jihad was for Islam and for the *Ummah* or, in the words of an Afghan Islamist refugee in Peshawar: 'The present

*Jehad* is not for the *watan* (fatherland), but for Islam- the *watan* is only *khak* (soil, dust).<sup>65</sup>

One other important Islamist refugee leader declared in Pakistan that “we will try to make Pakistan and Afghanistan one country with a new name of Islamistan, and if it was not possible, then we will make a confederation of the two countries.” In such a heat for Islamism another refugee leader boasted that “our *Jehad* is for the glorification of Allah’s will and our *Jehad* is not limited to the liberation of Afghanistan; we will liberate the Central Asian Muslims and will raise our flag on the Kremlin.”<sup>66</sup>

### **Rise of *Mujahideen* in Kabul:**

In May 1991 the UN Secretary General unveiled his five point peace plan for Afghanistan. The plan called for an independent, non-aligned, and Islamic State of Afghanistan; transition period agreed upon through an intra-Afghan dialogue during which an impartial mechanism would ensure ceasefire, and hold elections under the auspices of the UN; an end to arms supplies to all sides of the conflict; and financial and military assistance to rehabilitate, resettle the Afghan refugees, and reconstruct the war torn country.<sup>67</sup> A decision was taken by the government of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to go along with UN plans for negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, in the meeting of Afghan Cell in July 1991. But there was strong resistance against the change in Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan. As a result *Jama’at-e-*

*Islami* broke its alliance with the *Islami Jamhuri Ittihad* (IJI) government, and the 'UN' plan was also rejected outright by the *Mujahideen* factions of Khalis and Sayyaf first and later Hekmatyar as well. Hekmatyar asked the Pakistan government to workout a new formula for the solution of Afghan crisis which could be acceptable to the *Mujahideen*.<sup>68</sup> However, Pakistan extended its unqualified support to the UN plan. The following were some of the important factors which compelled Pakistani authorities to adopt political modalities for the resolution of Afghan Crisis:

- 1: Pakistan seemed to be frustrated over the inability of the *Mujahideen* to defeat President Najibullah militarily and they thought it was useless to continue support for *Mujahideen*.
- 2: As the war in Afghanistan did not seem that it would end in the near future, the international opinion was changed; and Washington was no more interested in sponsoring the Afghan *Mujahideen* after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan which came as a result of Geneva Accords.<sup>69</sup> Thus a major supporter of the *Mujahideen* openly blamed Pakistan for its support to Hekmatyar and other fundamentalist groups, and even pressured Islamabad to stop military aid to *Mujahideen*. The US authorities also made it clear to Pakistan that American aid to Pakistan would be stopped if there is no progress towards a political settlement. In September 1991, the US and USSR

concluded on a mutual cut-off of aid to Afghan groups as of January 1992, and stress for a negotiated settlement.<sup>70</sup>

- 3: The position of Islamist groups among 'Peshawar Seven' during the Gulf war was against Saudi Arabia which alienated the Saudis. They were not enthusiastic to support the *Mujahideen*. They became selective in their aid to *Mujahideen* and favored only the Sayyaf party.<sup>71</sup>
- 4: With the disintegration of USSR and the emergence of Central Asian republics, Pakistan visualized a great economic opportunity for itself in the new region. Afghanistan's political stability was not only a prerequisite to Pakistan gaining access to Central Asian markets but was also the only way to enhance Islamabad's geopolitical standing with the West in shaping the future evolution of Central Asia. It was therefore necessary to ensure some form of control over the southern corridor to Central Asia. Pakistan advocated for an early end to the war by sponsoring negotiation.
- 5: One other reason for the change in emphasis in Pakistan's policy was that there was also internal pressure on the Pakistani government from Pakistani political circles i.e. ANP and PPP.<sup>72</sup>

With the collapse of the Najibullah's regime<sup>73</sup> in Kabul in 1992, Pakistan along with Peshawar Seven *Tanzimat* was perturbed over the fast-changing development in and around

Afghanistan. It began striving its utmost to impose its own will through Afghan *Tanzimat*, in the new expected new set-up in Kabul. On April 20, it was reported that the official Pakistan efforts at achieving an accord had come to naught. The cynics saw this as a defeat for Pakistan fourteen years-long interventionist role to control the Afghan *Jehad*.<sup>74</sup> At last, after initial fruitless discussions, Pakistani officials including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif succeeded on April 24, 1992 in bringing the Afghan *Mujahideen* to sign Peshawar Accord creating the *Mujahideen* government in Kabul, in the fragmented state of Afghanistan.<sup>75</sup>

Pakistani authorities were also anxious to show their confidence in a new government under Mujaddadi. On April 29, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Kabul, along with army chief of staff General Asif Nawaz Janjuwa, ISI head General Javed Nasir and Saudi Prince Turki-Al-Faisal, to demonstrate Pakistan's backing for the interim government.<sup>76</sup> Nawaz Sharif met with President Mujaddedi and presented a 250 million rupees cheque.<sup>77</sup>

Perhaps the most pathetic and disgusting gesture that could ever be displayed by anyone on a foreign land was that of the head of ISI, Lt. General Javed Nasir, who soon after coming out of the Prime Minister aeroplane, shouted slogans of *Alah-o-Akbar*.<sup>78</sup> This attitude on the part of Javed Nasir was aimed at pointing out that his ISI had conquered Afghanistan.

A leading Afghan intellectual, Dr, Qaudir Amiryar, (a Professor in George Washington University) said that the present (as of 1992) chaos in Afghanistan was caused by an absence of

alternative to Najib government, though that was precisely what was supposed to have been put in place by the parties of the Geneva convention. He alleged that obsession of Pakistan's intelligence services for military victory paralyzed the process and, hence, led to the anarchy.<sup>79</sup> He pointed out that Pakistan encouraged the groups and parties preaching Islamization of Afghanistan, while discouraged the nationalist elite of Afghanistan to join the struggle. Pakistan systematically denied visas to nationalist, intelligentsia, and even to King Zahir Shah. It also rejected the composition of the government under Peshawar Accord. According to him that was not representative government, and had been imposed from outside.<sup>80</sup>

The Peshawar accord, and post-Peshawar Accord initiatives and efforts on the part of Pakistan did not produce the expected fruitful and positive results for ceasefire and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistan along with Iran and Saudi Arabia brought *Mujahideen* leaders to Islamabad and succeeded in signing of the Islamabad Accord on March 7, 1993 for a power sharing plan.<sup>81</sup> The Afghan signatories of the Accord backed out on one pretext or the other, but the dream of Akhtar Abdur Rahman that "Kabul Must burn" was realized by the 'Peshawar Seven' *Tanzimat*.

## References and Notes

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<sup>1</sup> This Pashtu *tappa* was very popular on both side of the Durand Line particularly after the fall of Najib and the rise of *Mujahideen* in Kabul, and the subsequent civil war which ensued between different factions of holy warriors

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for their own petty gains. The tappa was frequently seen painted in or on buses, rickshaws, and other transportation vehicles.

<sup>2</sup> Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985*, Oxford University Press, 2003, P.80

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Niaz A Naik, Islamabad, Sunday, 8 August, 1993; quoted by Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985*, Oxford University Press, 2003, P.92

<sup>4</sup> The following story appeared originally on the Indy Media site, Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France), January, 15-21, 1998, P. 76.

<sup>5</sup> It is also noteworthy that the former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Retd. General Nasirullah Babur, confessed several times in press that it was he who, during Z.A Bhutto regime, trained and organized Afghan terrorists to use them against Daud Khan. A large number of supporters of the *Seetmi-Milli*, *Shula-i-Jawaed*, *Hezbi-Islami*, *Jamiat-i-Islami* and *Harakat-i-Islami* began crossing into Pakistan.

<sup>6</sup> Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, Curzen Press Ltd, St. John's Studios, Church Road Richmond, Surrey TW9 2QA, 1995, P. 274. To one extent or another, all of the resistance part leaders were cultivated by Pakistan and were propped up by either government or an external power. Although previously there had been round about 60 to 80 resistance groups operating in Peshawar, in 1982, Pakistani authorities forced them to coalesce into seven. Nearly all the party leaders had a following, often narrow, based on respect for their religious scholarships, religious status, and experience as dissidents.

<sup>7</sup> Yousaf Elmi, *Afghanistan: A Decade of Sovietisation*, Afghan Jihad Works Centre, Peshawar, nd, P. 2 .

<sup>8</sup> Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1986, P. 120

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<sup>9</sup> Azizur Rahman Ulfat was assassinated by unknown assailants but mostly people suspected *Hezb* of Hekmatyar involvement in his murder. Aziz Rahman was the son of eminent Afghan Pashtu writer and poet Gul Pacha Ulfat from Ningrahar province of Afghanistan. Aziz Rahman openly criticized Pakistan government and the *Jehadi* leaders in his booklet “The *Crisis of Leadership*” published by the founder of the Islami *Entiqam* Party, 1981. In the same year (1981), another refugee Shuhrat Nangyal in his booklet “Afghanistan’s Political Parties” (*Da Afghanistan Siasi Ahzab*), Peshawar, pp. 47-48 wrote that “there are many groups and factions working on the name of ‘Islam’ or ‘Afghans’ (to the beginning or the end of their name); but otherwise every leader is (after free) ration and business. There are such leaders whose offices and parties are just in their pockets (i.e. the party exists o paper for the sole purpose of accumulating aid money). In this storm, there are horrible faces whose identity is (suspicious). The real leaders are hiding in the dust while only the businessmen are on the ground. Every *Muhajir* is thinking to become leader for the ration and not for nation. Most of them are leaders in Peshawar but having no courage to inter into Afghanistan”.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, “Afghanistan: Confusion of fusion and diffusion” The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, August 5 - 6, 1992.

<sup>11</sup> Olesen *opcit.* P.276; Even in 1982, when the author (Dr. Marwat ) was on the way towards Kabul from Jalalabad, the bus he was travelling on was stopped by security guards near Sarobi. One of them was Central Asian Tajik speaking Persian (Tajiki), who was informing the passengers in the bus that all people should be aware of the *Ashrars* and *Basmachis* (referring to anti- Kabul elements).

<sup>12</sup> S. Fida Yunas, *Afghanistan (1979-1997)*, Volume II, 31- A Sector D-5, Phase-1, Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1998, pp. 889-890.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*; also Interview with S. Fida Yunas, Area Study Centre (Central Asia, Afghanistan, China & Russia), University of Peshawar, 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2004.

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<sup>14</sup> An interesting feature of the 18-day parleys was the schedule of the summit meetings arranged at the office or residence of each leader in rotation. When it was arranged at the residence of Hekmatyar, he assigned his photographers to take photographs while he was in the chair, with the rest sitting around on the floor as in common practice. These photographs were released to the press with a story that all the *Muhajireen* (refugees) leaders accepted the leadership of Hekmatyar. It annoyed other leaders. See Taizai *Opcit*

<sup>15</sup> In 1981, the author (Dr. Marwat) personally observed that some Arab nationals, along with local Afghans, distributing money among Afghan refugees in Tambowano market on road side near Peshawar Airport.

<sup>16</sup> Aziz Rahman Ulfat, *The Crisis of Leadership*, published by the founder of the *Islami Entiqam* Party, Peshawar, 1981, P 11.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 3-9.

<sup>18</sup> In 1987, in Mashhad (Iran) an alliance was formed of the following eight groups:

(1) *Nohzat-e-Islami*, (2) *Sazman-e-Pasdaran*, (3) *Jehad-e-Islami*, (4) *Jabha-e-Motahed-e-Islami*, (5) *Sazman-e-Nasir*, (6) *Hezbollah*, (7) *Hezb-e-Dahwat-e-Islami*, (8) *Harakat-e-Islami*.

The three Quetta based *Shia* groups of the Afghan refugees were: (1) *Harakat-e-Islami* Afghanistan of Sheikh Asef Mohseni Kandahar, (2) *Shura-e-Inqilab-e-Ittifaq-e-Afghanistan* of Syed Behishti, and (3) *Sazman-e-Nasir-e-Islami* of was led by council.

<sup>19</sup> In the 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2004 meeting of a weekly seminar in the Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, General (retired) Naseerullah Babur in confessed that in 1973, Pakistani Prime Minister, the President, General Tikka Khan and Babur in a special meeting decided to use the Frontier Corps to train Afghans who had escaped from the Daud regime; he stated that this training was continued till July, 1977. Some of the Afghans trained during

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this period were: Habibur Rahman, Ahmad Shah Masud, Professor Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Younis Khalis, Mohammadi, Maulana Hadi, Gulab Ningrahari, Wakil Khan Shinwari, Younis Khogiani, even Dr. Najibullah requested for training but the army refused.

<sup>20</sup> George Arney, *Afghanistan*, Machelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London, 1990, P.135

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* P. 136

<sup>22</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April, 23, 1987, P. 40

<sup>23</sup> Robert Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia 1977-1988*, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., London, 1991, P. 62.

<sup>24</sup> *Newsweek*, February. 13, 1980, P. 9.

<sup>25</sup> Wirsing *Opcit*, P.62; In his book, Hekmatyar states that in a meeting with Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Pakistani President) he proposed the appointment of General Hamid Gul as the new Chief of Pakistan's army ... G. I Khan smiled and told me: "You are right, but the Americans will be aggrieved by this action. They say that General Hamid Gul is fundamentalist". Hekmatyar's Pashtu book translated by Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, *Secret Plans, Open Faces*, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2004, P. 25.

<sup>26</sup> Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & S. Wiqar Ali Shah KakaKhel, *Afghanistan and the Frontier*, EMJAY Books International, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1993, P. 225.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* P. 229.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* P. 230.

<sup>29</sup> John Fullerton, *Afghanistan*, Far Eastern Economic Review. Ltd., Hong Kong, 1983, P. 72 .

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* P. 74 .

<sup>31</sup> Marwat & Kakakhel *Opcit.* P 230.

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<sup>32</sup> Fullerton *Opcit*, P. 73.

<sup>33</sup> David C. Isby, *War in a Distant Country*, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989, P.99.

<sup>34</sup> Roy *Opcit*, P. 119

<sup>35</sup> Marwat & Kakakhel *Opcit*, P. 217

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*. P 217.

<sup>37</sup> Roy *Opcit*, P. 123

<sup>38</sup> Discussions with party members and followers in Afghan Refugee Commissionrate, Peshawar. Novmber-December, 1981.

<sup>39</sup> The Supreme Council was the most powerful organization wherein the organizational and political activities of those *Mujahideen* affiliated to the organization were discussed. The Board of Directors, comprising leaders of the component parties, acted as Supreme Command of the alliance for military operations across the border. Financial assistance received by the component parties would be submitted to the Board of Directors, and then subsequently forwarded to the Finance Committee along with official documents. According to the Character of Organization, the Military Committee for which efforts were being made was responsible for disposing off arms and ammuniton received by various component organizations. The alliance favored getting financial assistance from the Western countries in addition to the Muslim world. Letters in Russian language were published requesting Muslim Russian soldiers not to side with Russians in Afghanistan. The same letters also pressed upon the peoples of Muslim republic of Soviet Russia to start revolutions in their respective republics to achieve independence. Such materials were secretly distributed by their *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan, in those areas where the Russians were in control. See also Marwat & Kakakhel *Opcit*. pp. 220-222.

<sup>40</sup> Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan*, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1982, pp 102-103;

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Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Oxford university Press, Karachi, 1999, P. 207 quoted from other sources that in 1981-83 the *Mujahideen* were 45000, by 1986 they numbered 150,000; and in 1989 this numbered increased to 200000.

<sup>41</sup> Between 1980 and 1983, the refugees were obliged to become members of one or other of these parties in order to obtain their share of aid. See also Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985*, Oxford University Press, 2003, P. 82.

<sup>42</sup> Brigadier (Retd) Mohammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier: The Man behind Afghan Jihad*, Jang Publishers, Lahore, pp. 14-15.

<sup>43</sup> Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story*, Jang Publisher Lahore, 1992, P. 105; Muhammad Saddiq Kanju, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a 1993 interview, "These accusation are unfounded. Pakistan has no favourites among the Afghan groups. Pakistan could not unilaterally allocate assistance to the *Mujahideen Tanzimat*. There was a regularly procedure under which the donor countries were consulted and assistance was provided with their knowledge and approval". General Hamid Gul, Director General ISI in 1993 argued: "The distribution system was.... fair and professionally justifiable on the basis of standard criteria: performance, organizational ability to assimilate, integrity etc. There were no favourites. No body received the lion's share. It is mere propaganda". See *Defence Journal*, Karachi, Vol: XVII, 1993, pp. 26, 29.

<sup>44</sup> Yousaf, (*Silent Soldier*), pp. 11-12.

<sup>45</sup> Pakistan tried to monitor all aspects of the Afghan presence in Pakistan, as well as the conduct of the war, with a view to making the military efforts of the Afghan resistance coincide with Pakistan's interests. The resistance received training;; it was channelled and organized. The activities of the *Mujahideen* were curbed as well as encouraged. The ISI took up controlling and coordinating the resistance parties based in Peshawar, and tried to manipulate the Afghan political personalities.

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- <sup>46</sup> Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin *Opcit.* pp .1-7; see also his book *Silent Soldier*.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* P. 98; *Silent Soldier*, pp. 6-9.
- <sup>48</sup> Roy *Opcit.*, P.122.
- <sup>49</sup> Frederic Grare *Opcit.*, P. 84.
- <sup>50</sup> Roy *Opcit.*, pp.121-122.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* P. 122.
- <sup>52</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Pakistan and Afghanistan, Resistance and Reconstruction*, West view Press, INC, USA, 1994, P. 29; See also Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin *Opcit.*
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* (Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin) P. 3.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* P. 4
- <sup>55</sup> Field Report 1982-83 and 1990-91, Peshawar.
- <sup>56</sup> Frederic Grare *Opcit.*, P. 83
- <sup>57</sup> Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat personal papers, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Pakistan.
- <sup>58</sup> Weinbaum *Opcit.*, P. 34 quoted Mushahid Hussain from the *Christian Science Monitor*, October 3, 1989; Being an old friend of Pakistani establishment, Hekmatyar was opposed to the idea of an ethnic, secular state of Pashtunistan, the *Loya Jirga*, and Zahir Shah, and was anti-India and ant-USSR.
- <sup>59</sup> Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The inside story of the Soviet withdrawal*, Oxford University Press, New York, P. 162.
- <sup>60</sup> Weinbaum *Opcit.*, P. 34.
- <sup>61</sup> Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin *Opcit.*, P. 40.
- <sup>62</sup> The Pashto monthly *Leekwal*, Peshawar, April 2004, pp. 16, 17.

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<sup>63</sup> Field Report of 1988-89, Peshawar, Kurram Agency and Bannu.

<sup>64</sup> Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, *The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-79) An Appraisal*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997, P 350; See for biography of Noor M. Taraki, H. Amin, cf. appendix –B of this book.

<sup>65</sup> Olesen *Opcit*, P. 288.

<sup>66</sup> Professor Rasul Amin, *A Collection of Professor A. Rasul Amin's Papers*, (Pashtu) The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA), Peshawar, 1995, P. 70.

<sup>67</sup> Raziullah Azmi, ed. *Pak-American Relations: The Recent past*, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1994, P. 42.

<sup>68</sup> Rashid Ahmad Saddiqui, "Pakistan Afghan Policy after the Soviet withdrawal", Unpublished M. Phil thesis, Institute of Pakistan Studies Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 1996, P. 17.

<sup>69</sup> For details of Geneva Accord see Appendix-F; The Afghan venture had cost the Soviets over 13,000 dead, 35,000 wounded and 311 missing. Reportedly, it had required one million rubbles a day to keep the war going. In terms of cash, the price rose steeply as soon as they withdrew. Only the most massive logistic efforts could keep Najibullah's men fighting, and the Soviets supplied. American officials estimated that Afghanistan received military supplies worth up to \$300 million per month after February, 1989. In the six months following their withdrawal at least 3,800 aircraft flew in, carrying food, fuel, weapons and ammunition. Compare this with the US aid for 1988, valued at \$600 million, and the imbalance is crystal clear. In 1988 over 1,000 armored vehicles were handed over by the departing Soviets. It is estimated that the first six months of 1989 saw the transfer of \$ 1.5 billion of military support to the Kabul regime, including 500 Scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Afghan Army still had tremendous superiority in what I call the three 'A's': armor, artillery and aircraft. Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin *Opcit*, pp.216, 227.

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<sup>70</sup> The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, February 1992.

<sup>71</sup> Charles H. Kennedy, ed. *Pakistan-1992*, Lahore, West Press Oxford Pak Book Cooperation, 1993, P. 129.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, P. 130.

<sup>73</sup> For biography of Dr. Najibullah, cf. Appendix-C of this book.

<sup>74</sup> Amera Saeed, "The Peshawar Accord and After", See in *Afghanistan's Past, Present and future*, Islamabad Regional Studies Islamabad, 1997, P. 422.

<sup>75</sup> Intense rounds of talks started at Peshawar to arrange a transitional government for the transfer of power in Kabul. The talks began in Peshawar between the Pakistan government and the *Mujahideen* leaders. The Afghan leaders present were Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, Engineer Qatabuddin Hilal, Commandar Musa and Qazi Amin Waqad, Ayatullah Muhsini, Javed and son of Subghatullah Mujaddidi. Four leaders were absent being represented only by their spokesmen, and Maulvi Yunas Khalis, in spite of their presence in and around Peshawar did not attend the meeting. This was a significant signal of their independence of action. For days it appeared that the fighting among parties would preclude any agreement despite the strong intercession of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the foreign Ministry officials. The Prime Minister was joined in Peshawar by Saudi Prince Turki-al-Faisal, King Fahd's special envoy. At the same time, Mir Hamid Musavi, a former ambassador to Pakistan, was deputed from Tehran to ensure that the deal to form a new government incorporated Iranian interests. Unable to move the factions, frustrated Pakistani officials brought the Afghans together with the leaders of several of Pakistan's religio-political parties, including Qazi Hussain Ahmed's *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan, who were asked to use their influence with various Afghans groups to reach a consensus. In the end, the Peshawar based leaders agreed to a formula, mainly out of the fear, that if they delayed any further, the field commanders, notably Ahmad Shah Masud, would take matters

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into their hands and by pass the parties. For the text of Peshawar Accord see Appendix-D of this book.

<sup>76</sup> *The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments, Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Islamabad, Institute of Regional Studies, Vol. xii, No. 3, March 1993, P. 31.

<sup>77</sup> The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, April 30, 1992.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>79</sup> Daily *The Nation*, June 07, 1992.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*; Mohammad Sarwar (Pakistan Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington) rejected Amiryar's assertions and allegations by saying. Pakistan was not interfering in Afghan internal affairs and was only trying to help for reconstruction and stabilization of war torn country... Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the Afghanistan liberation and still host to three million Afghan refugees. The seminar, which was sponsored by International forum of George Washington University on the theme "Afghan immigrants about Pakistan interventionist policy towards Afghanistan".

<sup>81</sup> The agreement was signed on March 7, in the presence of Nawaz Sharif, Saudi Prince Faisal and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister. On March 8, all the signatories of Islamabad Accord accompanied by Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif flew to Saudi Arabia for a joint *umera*. Further consultations followed, which were rounded on by an agreement among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran, to act as guarantors of Islamabad accord. The Islamabad Accord was more substantive and balanced document than was the Peshawar Accord. For a text of the Islamabad Peace Accord, see Appendix-E of this book.